Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes q

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lambais, Guilherme; Sigstad, Henrik
• 署名单位: Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon (ICS-UL); Universidade de Lisboa; BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104788
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Judicial independence; Official misconduct

摘要

Are politicians in power treated more leniently in court? We show that Brazilian mayoral candidates charged with misconduct are 65 percent less likely to be convicted if they narrowly win the election. Politicians play no direct role in the judges' careers, suggesting that formal independence does not completely insulate the judiciary from political influence. The effect is driven by districts with few judges and by judges with higher career instability. (c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).