Organized crime, corruption and punishment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kugler, M; Verdierb, T; Zenou, Y
• 署名单位: University of Southampton; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Le Mans Universite
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1639-1663
• 关键词: deterrence; organized crime; CORRUPTION; oligopoly; free entry

摘要

We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyond a threshold, further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings, and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.