Restricted Coasean bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus
• 署名单位: University of Queensland; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.11.002
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 296-307
• 关键词: Coase theorem; Bargaining restrictions; Contest; all-pay auction

摘要

We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find that bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost uncertainty over the harmful activity, we show that an efficient configuration of restrictions must balance the potential reduction in appropriation costs with the possibility of allocatively inefficient bargaining restrictions. For an all-pay auction, we find conditions where precluding bargaining is always ex ante preferable to unrestricted bargaining. For cases where the restrictions are contested, we show conditions for the continuing existence of welfare improvements. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.