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作者：Choe, CW
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：I study optimal managerial contracts in two contracting environments. When the investment return is contractible, an optimal contract combines a base salary, golden parachute, and bonus. When the return is not contractible, two types of optimal contracts are studied: a contract with restricted stock and a contract with stock options. These three types of contracts are equivalent: they implement the same outcome and lead to the same expected payoff for the manager, implying that the choice of c...
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作者：Johnson, William R.; Ziliak, James P.
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Kentucky
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作者：Ishida, Junichiro
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This article considers a model where the agent is uncertain about his innate ability and instead makes an inference from others' ( namely, the principal's) perception, as often emphasized in the psychology literature. When the principal has superior knowledge about the agent's productivity than the agent himself, the principal has an incentive to use promotions strategically to boost the agent's self-confidence. Within this framework the optimal promotion policy depends not only on the agent's...
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作者：Danziger, L; Neuman, S
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Central European University; Bar Ilan University
摘要：In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often-protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. T...
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作者：Horstmann, IJ; Mathewson, F; Quigley, N
作者单位：University of Toronto; Victoria University Wellington
摘要：In certain industries, sales agent contracts include provisions for sales commissions and clawbacks of commissions if clients are not retained. We show that contracts with these features arise in environments having up-front selling costs recouped from ongoing sales; heterogeneous customers; limited agent access to capital markets; and imperfect commitment to long-term contracts. We test the model using information on insurance sales agent contracts from New Zealand prior to and after bank ent...
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作者：Gibbons, R; Katz, LF; Lemieux, T; Parent, D
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of British Columbia; McGill University
摘要：We develop a model in which a worker's skills determine the worker's current wage and sector. The market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker's skills. Endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor market participants learn about these unobserved skills. We show how the model can be estimated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques. We apply our methodology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations and industries using individ...
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作者：Kwon, I
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Many people are fired from their jobs for poor performance. However, it is difficult to distinguish whether they are fired because they are not well suited for their job ( sorting explanation) or because the firms are trying to provide incentives for effort ( incentive explanation). This article develops a dynamic incentive model of dismissal and proposes a methodology to distinguish between these two explanations. The methodology is based on learning-by-doing and changes in the slope of dismi...
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作者：Beaudry, P; Green, DA
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This article examines the determinants of changes in the U. S. wage structure from 1976 to 2000. Our main empirical observation is that changes in both the level of wages and the returns to skill over this period were primarily driven by changes in the ratio of human capital to physical capital. We show that this pattern conforms extremely well to a simple model of technological adoption following a major change in technological opportunities. In contrast, we do not find much empirical support...
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作者：Chen, KP
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan; National Taiwan University
摘要：External recruitment is often believed to be harmful in that it trades off the need for outside talents with the incentives of inside workers. This article shows that, even from an incentive viewpoint, external recruitment has its powerful function. Specifically, if promotion is based on relative performance, then negative activities (sabotages) are a valuable instrument for competition. This results in inefficiency of the firm. External recruitment, by reducing the marginal return of negative...
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作者：Currie, J; Willis, B; Farber, H; Light, A; Bound, J; Rivkin, S; Welch, F; Pencavel, J
