-
作者：BERTOLA, G
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Labor turnover costs may or may not decrease average employment in a partial equilibrium model of labor demand, depending on the form of the revenue function, on the rates of discount and of labor attrition, and on the relative size of hiring and firing costs. If discount and attrition rates are strictly positive, firing costs may well increase average employment even when hiring costs reduce it.
-
作者：PRESCOTT, D; WILTON, D
作者单位：University of Waterloo
摘要：Wage changes in a sample (1979-86) of Canadian wage contracts are analyzed. The sample is split into cost-of-living allowance (COLA) and non-COLA contracts. Econometric estimation corrects for sample selectivity bias. In non-COLA contracts, the unemployment rate and a proxy for expected inflation are significant. Expected industry price changes and productivity changes exert smaller but significant effects. In COLA contracts, ex ante inflation coverage ranges between 60% and 100% of expected i...
-
作者：ALBRECHT, JW; VROMAN, SB
摘要：This article presents an equilibrium model of a dual labor market. Firms are assumed to be identical ex ante, and dualism arises endogenously. The dual labor market outcome is supported by efficiency wage and search considerations. Firms choose wage/effort requirement packages optimally given optimal search and effort choice by workers, and vice versa. We prove existence and investigate the occurrence and nature of dual labor market equilibria.
-
作者：LIGHT, A; URETA, M
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Using National Longitudinal Survey data, we estimate proportional hazard models in order to learn whether it is more difficult for employers to identify female nonquitters than male nonquitters. We find that women may be a higher risk than men in the overall sample because they are more likely to be movers for unobserved reasons. When we focus on a relatively recent birth cohort, however, we find that it is no longer difficult to identify female nonquitters. Unobserved heterogeneity becomes an...
-
作者：KANEMOTO, Y; MACLEOD, WB
作者单位：Universite de Montreal
摘要：Workers in a long-term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early in the relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in the future. We show that competition for older workers will permit the implementation of efficient piece-rate contracts. When the difficulty of the job is unobserved by the firm, Gibbons (1987) has shown that all piece-rate contracts will be inefficient. Together, these results may explain why piece rates are com...
-
作者：BROWN, JN; LIGHT, A
摘要：Tenure responses in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Surveys are often inconsistent with calendar time. These inconsistencies pose special problems in the PSID because job changes cannot be identified directly, so researchers must infer them from error-ridden tenure data. We use alternative rules for partitioning PSID data into jobs and then estimate several wage and mobility models to assess the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the partitioning meth...
-
作者：RUHM, CJ
摘要：This article investigates whether prenotification decreases postdisplacement joblessness. Reduced-form estimates indicate that lengthy written notice is associated with small increases in the probability of avoiding nonemployment but with no decline in average durations. Significant reductions are found, however, for household heads, women, nonwhites, and in local labor markets with high unemployment rates. A new method is developed to control for the endogeneity of voluntarily provided advanc...
-
作者：KUHN, P
摘要：Firms' incentives to inform workers about their future viability are analyzed using a two-period signaling model. I find that, if wages can be set after firms learn their viability, they will perfectly signal firms' closure plans. Mandatory-notice laws, if they have any effect at all, reduce worker utility and raise profits because they obviate the need for permanent firms to signal via higher wages. If a noncontingent wage must be set before any private information arrives, pooling occurs in ...
-
作者：LABAND, DN; LENTZ, BF
摘要：We argue that lawyers' sons follow in their parents' footsteps because the occupation lends itself to low-cost transfer of relevant skills and knowledge from one generation to the next, especially in the context of the family law practice. Analysis of Project Talent data reveals that knowledge about the law is transmitted from lawyers to their children and that this transmitted knowledge is a significant factor in a son's decision to follow in his father's legal footsteps. Second-generation la...
-
作者：GARVEY, GT; SWAN, PL
摘要：Worker incentive schemes are invariably assumed to be administered by an owner-entrepreneur who has an incentive to understate worker performance after the event. While tournaments can overcome this problem, they discourage cooperation between workers. We show that a professional manager concerned with equality between workers and with avoiding bankruptcy rather than maximizing shareholder wealth will conduct a tournament that preserves individual effort incentives while promoting cooperation ...
