MANDATORY NOTICE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: KUHN, P
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298281
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 117-137
• 关键词: plant closings; worker displacement; job displacement; advance notice; unemployment; duration

摘要

Firms' incentives to inform workers about their future viability are analyzed using a two-period signaling model. I find that, if wages can be set after firms learn their viability, they will perfectly signal firms' closure plans. Mandatory-notice laws, if they have any effect at all, reduce worker utility and raise profits because they obviate the need for permanent firms to signal via higher wages. If a noncontingent wage must be set before any private information arrives, pooling occurs in the absence of legislation, and mandatory-notice laws can be Pareto improving.