THE RATCHET EFFECT AND THE MARKET FOR SECONDHAND WORKERS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
KANEMOTO, Y; MACLEOD, WB
署名单位：
Universite de Montreal
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0734-306X
DOI：
10.1086/298279
发表日期：
1992
页码：
85-98
关键词：
摘要：
Workers in a long-term relationship often have an incentive to hide their ability early in the relationship to avoid having the firm increase the level of output expected from them in the future. We show that competition for older workers will permit the implementation of efficient piece-rate contracts. When the difficulty of the job is unobserved by the firm, Gibbons (1987) has shown that all piece-rate contracts will be inefficient. Together, these results may explain why piece rates are common in some jobs, such as agricultural work and sales, and not as popular for many manufacturing jobs.
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