Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lackner, Martin; Skowron, Piotr
• 署名单位: Technische Universitat Wien; University of Warsaw
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105173
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Axiomatic characterization; Approval voting; proportionality

摘要

This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based committee (ABC) rules. These are multi-winner voting rules that select a committee, i.e., a fixed-size group of candidates, based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of ABC scoring rules and provide an axiomatic characterization of this class based on the consistency axiom. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval Chamberlin-Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of ABC scoring rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting rules may represent: proportionality, diversity, and individual excellence. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.