Manipulability in school choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Decerf, Benoit; Van der Linden, Martin
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Emory University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105313
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Dominant strategy; manipulability; Tie-breaking; boston mechanism; Deferred acceptance mechanism

摘要

We compare the manipulability of school choice mechanisms based on the occurrence of dominant strate-gies. We characterize dominant strategies in the constrained versions of the deferred acceptance (DA) and Boston (BOS) mechanisms. We leverage our characterizations to show that dominant strategies occur more often in constrained DA than in constrained BOS and that these differences can be quantitatively sizable. Dominant strategies also become more frequent in constrained DA as students are allowed to report more schools. Although our focus is on constrained mechanisms, we provide dominant strategies comparisons for other mechanisms as well, including application-rejection mechanisms and mechanisms that Pareto dominate DA. (c) 2021. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Published by Else-vier Inc. All rights reserved.