Non-Walrasian equilibria and the law of one price

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koutsougeras, LC
• 署名单位: University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00014-5
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 169-175
• 关键词: multiple posts; arbitrage; Law of one price

摘要

We present a market game which features multiple posts for each commodity. We use this framework to illustrate the idea that in non-Walrasian markets, where individual activities influence market clearing prices, there are equilibria where commodities are exchanged simultaneously in two posts at different prices, thus defying the 'law of one price'. Such equilibria are compatible with an apparent arbitrage possibility, which dissipates whenever individuals try to take advantage of it. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.