Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Yoshihara, N
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00026-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 256-285
• 关键词: axiomatic characterizations; bargaining solutions; production economies; responsibility and compensation

摘要

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w. r. t. technological innovations, so that the non-weltaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.