The robust selection of rationalizability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yi-Chun; Takahashi, Satoru; Xiong, Siyang
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; University of Bristol
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.02.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 448-475
• 关键词: Equilibrium refinement; WY selection; Robust selection; E-mail game; Global game

摘要

We propose a notion of selecting rationalizable actions by perturbing players' higher-order beliefs, which we call robust selection. Similarly to WY selection [28], robust selection generalizes the idea behind the equilibrium selection in the email game [27] and the global game [3]. In contrast to WY selection, however, we require selection to be robust to misspecifications of payoffs. Robust selection is a strong notion in the sense that, among types with multiple rationalizable actions, almost all selections are fragile; but it is also a weak notion in the sense that any strictly rationalizable action can be robustly selected. We show that robust selection is fully characterized by the curb collection, a notion that generalizes the curb set in [2]. We also use the curb collection to characterize critical types [12] in any fixed finite game. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.