Collective rationality and monotone path division rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stovall, John E.
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.08.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1-24
• 关键词: Claims; bankruptcy; Fair allocation; Consistency; Independence of irrelevant alternatives; Collective rationality

摘要

We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on division rules for the conflicting claims problem. With the addition of Consistency and Resource Monotonicity, this characterizes a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways. First, a rule is identified with a fixed monotone path in the space of awards, and for a given claims vector, the path of awards for that claims vector is simply the monotone path truncated by the claims vector. Second, a rule is identified with a set of parametric functions indexed by the claimants, and for a given claims problem, each claimant receives the value of his parametric function at a common parameter value, but truncated by his claim. Third, a rule is identified with an additively separable, strictly concave social welfare function, and for a given claims problem, the amount awarded is the maximizer of the social welfare function subject to the constraint of choosing a feasible award. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.