On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doval, Laura; Szentes, Balazs
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.019
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 106-130
• 关键词: Dynamic matching; Queueing; Two-sided markets; EFFICIENCY; discounting; Flow costs

摘要

We study a two-sided dynamic matching market where agents arrive randomly. An arriving agent is immediately matched if agents are waiting on the other side. Otherwise, the agent decides whether to exit the market or join a queue to wait for a match. Waiting is costly: agents discount the future and incur costs while they wait. We characterize the equilibrium and socially optimal queue sizes under first-come, first-served. Depending on the model parameters, equilibrium queues can be shorter or longer than efficiency would require them to be. Indeed, socially optimal queues may be unbounded, even if equilibrium queues are not. By contrast, when agents only incur flow costs while they wait, equilibrium queues are typically longer than socially optimal ones (cf. Baccara et al., 2020). Unlike one-sided markets, the comparison between equilibrium and socially optimal queues in two-sided markets depends on agents' time preferences.