Optimal grading contests
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Goel, Sumit
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.005
发表日期：
2025
页码：
133-149
关键词：
摘要：
We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce more competitive contests, i.e., contests with greater inequality across prizes. In the contest framework, we investigate the effect of manipulating individual prizes and increasing competition on expected effort, identifying conditions on ability distributions and cost functions under which these transformations may encourage or discourage effort. Our results suggest that more informative grading schemes encourage effort when agents of moderate ability are highly likely, and discourage effort when such agents are unlikely.
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