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作者：Llavador, H; Oxoby, RJ
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Calgary
摘要：We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: when (1) there exists an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are n...
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作者：Fernández, R; Guner, N; Knowles, J
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper examines the interactions between household formation, inequality, and per capita income. We develop a model in which agents decide to become skilled or unskilled and form households. We show that the equilibrium sorting of spouses by skill type (their correlation in skills) is an increasing function of the skill premium. In the absence of perfect capital markets, the economy can converge to different steady states, depending upon initial conditions. The degree of marital sorting an...
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作者：Fuchs-Schündeln, N; Schündeln, M
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We combine particular features of the German civil service with the unique event of German reunification to test the theory of precautionary savings and to quantify the importance of self-selection into occupations due to differences in risk aversion. In the presence of self-selection, failing to control for risk aversion in empirical tests of precautionary savings results in a bias that could lead to a systematic underestimation of the importance of precautionary savings. We exploit the fact ...
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作者：Aghion, P; Bloom, N; Blundell, R; Griffith, R; Howitt, P
作者单位：Harvard University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London; Brown University
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition and innovation. We find strong evidence of an inverted-U relationship using panel data. We develop a model where competition discourages laggard firms from innovating but encourages neck-and-neck firms to innovate. Together with the effect of competition on the equilibrium industry structure, these generate an inverted-U. Two additional predictions of the model-that the average technological distance between leaders an...
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作者：Luttmer, EFP
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper investigates whether individuals feel worse off when others around them earn more. In other words, do people care about relative position, and does lagging behind the Joneses diminish well-being? To answer this question, I match individual-level data containing various indicators of well-being to information about local average earnings. I find that, controlling for an individual's own income, higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness. ...
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作者：Jones, CI
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper views the standard production function in macroeconomics as a reduced form and derives its properties from microfoundations. The shape of this production function is governed by the distribution of ideas. If that distribution is Pareto, then two results obtain: the global production function is Cobb-Douglas, and technical change in the long run is labor-augmenting. Kortum showed that Pareto distributions are necessary if search-based idea models are to exhibit steady-state growth. H...
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作者：Aghion, P; Alesina, A; Trebbi, F
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)major...
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作者：Alcalá, F; Ciccone, A
作者单位：University of Murcia; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We find that international trade has an economically significant and statistically robust positive effect on productivity. Our trade measure is imports plus exports relative to purchasing power parity GDP (real openness), which we argue is preferable on theoretical grounds to the nominal measure conventionally used. We also find a significantly positive aggregate scale effect. Our estimates control for proxies of institutional quality as well as geography and take into account the endogeneity ...
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作者：Lizzeri, A; Persico, N
作者单位：New York University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits. If these programs are valuable, a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised. We ...
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作者：Yildiz, M
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要：I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date, but never reach one before it. Given any discount rate, if the learning is sufficiently slow, the players agree immediately. 1 show that, for any speed of learning, the agr...
