Endogenous political institutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aghion, P; Alesina, A; Trebbi, F
• 署名单位: Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/0033553041382148
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 565-611
• 关键词: Democracy; CHOICE; GROWTH; extend

摘要

A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)majority needed to govern. We analyze both optimal constitutional design and positive aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.