Waiting to persuade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yildiz, M
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/003355304772839579
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 223-248
• 关键词: SPECULATIVE INVESTOR BEHAVIOR; common prior; equilibrium; MODEL; games; delay

摘要

I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date, but never reach one before it. Given any discount rate, if the learning is sufficiently slow, the players agree immediately. 1 show that, for any speed of learning, the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long, provided that the players are sufficiently patient. Therefore, although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay, it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn.