Making Information More Valuable

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Whitmeyer, Mark
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/739326
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: RADNER-STIGLITZ NONCONCAVITY

摘要

We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent's reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the transformation corresponds to the addition of an action, the requisite increase in convexity occurs if and only if a simple geometric condition holds, which extends in a natural way to the addition of multiple actions. We apply these findings to two scenarios: a monopolistic screening problem in which the good is information and delegation with information acquisition.