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作者：Spady, Richard H.; Stouli, Sami
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Oxford; University of Bristol; University of Melbourne
摘要：We propose flexible Gaussian representations for conditional cumulative distribution functions and give a concave likelihood criterion for their estimation. Optimal representations satisfy the monotonicity property of conditional cumulative distribution functions, including in finite samples and under general misspecification. We use these representations to provide a unified framework for the flexible maximum likelihood estimation of conditional density, cumulative distribution, and quantile ...
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作者：Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
摘要：We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash-flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second-highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's informa...
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Quah, John K. -H.; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; National University of Singapore; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics for models with adjustment costs. We show that comparative-statics conclusions may be drawn under the usual ordinal complementarity assumptions on the objective function, assuming very little about costs: only a mild monotonicity condition is required. We use this insight to prove a general Le Chatelier principle: under the ordinal complementarity assumptions, if short-run adjustment is subject to a monotone cost, then the long-run response t...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Duanmu, Haosui
作者单位：Harbin Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We propose two general equilibrium models, quota equilibrium, and emission tax equilibrium. Government specifies quotas or taxes on emissions, and then refrains from further action. All results remain valid regardless of how government chooses its emissions target. Quota equilibrium exists; the allocation of emission property rights impacts the distribution of welfare. If the only externality arises from total net emissions, quota equilibrium is Pareto optimal among all feasible outcomes with ...
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作者：Beraja, Martin; Hurst, Erik; Ospina, Juan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Chicago; Banco de la Republica Colombia
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作者：Nelson, Scott T.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：The 2009 CARD Act limited credit card lenders' ability to raise borrowers' interest rates on the basis of new information. Pricing became less responsive to public and private signals of borrowers' risk and demand characteristics, and price dispersion fell by one-third. I estimate the efficiency and distributional effects of this shift toward more pooled pricing. Prices fell for high-risk and price-inelastic consumers, but prices rose elsewhere in the market and newly exceeded willingness to p...
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作者：Agarwal, Nikhil; Hodgson, Charles; Somaini, Paulo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based mechanisms perform well when assessed based on these outcomes. This paper evaluates the assignment mechanism for allocating deceased donor kidneys on the basis of patient life-years from transplantation ...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Rietzke, David
作者单位：University of Iowa; Lancaster University
摘要：Milgrom and Shannon (1994) provide necessary and sufficient conditions on parameterized optimization problems for their solution sets to be globally monotone in the parameter. We establish that their conditions may be significantly relaxed when focusing on discrete, binary comparisons between solution sets. Such binary comparisons are ubiquitous in economics and may involve comparing the same decision maker across two distinct regimes or two distinct decision makers with related objectives (e....
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作者：Arellano, Manuel; Bonhomme, Stephane; Suarez, Sofia Borodich; Schumann, Martin; Shi, Xiaoxia; Tripathi, Gautam
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Luxembourg; Maastricht University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Bloedel, Alexander W.; Krishna, R. Vijay; Leukhina, Oksana
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：We study the implications of optimal insurance provision for long-run welfare and inequality in economies with persistent private information. A principal insures an agent whose private type follows an ergodic, finite-state Markov chain. The optimal contract always induces immiseration: the agent's consumption and utility decrease without bound. Under positive serial correlation, it also backloads high-powered incentives: the sensitivity of the agent's utility with respect to his reports incre...
