Choices and Outcomes in Assignment Mechanisms: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agarwal, Nikhil; Hodgson, Charles; Somaini, Paulo
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20203
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 395-438
• 关键词: School choice; PANCREAS; DESIGN

摘要

While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based mechanisms perform well when assessed based on these outcomes. This paper evaluates the assignment mechanism for allocating deceased donor kidneys on the basis of patient life-years from transplantation (LYFT). We examine the role of choice in increasing LYFT and compare realized assignments to benchmarks that remove choice. Our model combines choices and outcomes in order to study how selection affects LYFT. We show how to identify and estimate the model using instruments derived from the mechanism. The estimates suggest that the design in use selects patients with better post-transplant survival prospects and matches them well, resulting in an average LYFT of 9.29, which is 1.75 years more than a random assignment. However, the maximum aggregate LYFT is 14.08. Realizing the majority of the gains requires transplanting relatively healthy patients, who would have longer life expectancies even without a transplant. Therefore, a policymaker faces a dilemma between transplanting patients who are sicker and those for whom life will be extended the longest.