Auctioning Control and Cash-Flow Rights Separately
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Liu, Tingjun; Bernhardt, Dan
署名单位：
University of Hong Kong; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.3982/ECTA21343
发表日期：
2025
页码：
859-889
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash-flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second-highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's information rent, which depends on the importance of his private information for the value of his awarded cash flows. As project payoffs are most sensitive to a bidder's information if he controls the project, allocating cash flow to another bidder lowers bidders' informational advantage. As a result, when signals are close, the seller can increase revenues by splitting rights between the top two bidders.