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作者：Detemple, Jerome; Rindisbacher, Marcel; Robertson, Scott
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：We study equilibria in multi-asset and multi-agent continuous-time economies with asymmetric information and bounded rational noise traders. We establish the existence of two equilibria. First, a full communication equilibrium where the informed agents' signal is disclosed to the market and static policies are optimal. Second, a partial communication equilibrium where the signal disclosed is affine in the informed and noise traders' signals, and dynamic policies are optimal. Here, information ...
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作者：De Chaisemartin, Clement; Behaghel, Luc
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Paris School of Economics; INRAE
摘要：Oversubscribed treatments are often allocated using randomized waiting lists. Applicants are ranked randomly, and treatment offers are made following that ranking until all seats are filled. To estimate causal effects, researchers often compare applicants getting and not getting an offer. We show that those two groups are not statistically comparable. Therefore, the estimator arising from that comparison is inconsistent when the number of waitlists goes to infinity. We propose a new estimator,...
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作者：Backus, Matthew
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：The correlation between productivity and competition is an oft observed but incompletely understood result. Some suggest that there is a treatment effect of competition on measured productivity, for example, through a reduction of managerial slack. Others argue that greater competition makes unproductive establishments exit by reallocating demand to their productive rivals, raising observed average productivity via selection. I study the ready-mix concrete industry and offer three perspectives...
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作者：Koh, Dongya; Santaeulalia-Llopis, Rauel; Zheng, Yu
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study the behavior of the U.S. labor share over the past 90 years. We find that the observed decline of the labor share is entirely explained by the capitalization of intellectual property products in the national income and product accounts.
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作者：Arbatli, Cemal Eren; Ashraf, Quamrul H.; Galor, Oded; Klemp, Marc
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Williams College; Brown University; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This research advances the hypothesis and establishes empirically that interpersonal population diversity, rather than fractionalization or polarization across ethnic groups, has been pivotal to the emergence, prevalence, recurrence, and severity of intrasocietal conflicts. Exploiting an exogenous source of variations in population diversity across nations and ethnic groups, as determined predominantly during the exodus of humans from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, the study demonstrat...
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作者：Andrews, Isaiah; Gentzkow, Matthew; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Brown University
摘要：We propose a way to formalize the relationship between descriptive analysis and structural estimation. A researcher reports an estimate (c) over cap of a structural quantity of interest c that is exactly or asymptotically unbiased under some base model. The researcher also reports descriptive statistics (gamma) over cap that estimate features gamma of the distribution of the data that are related to c under the base model. A reader entertains a less restrictive model that is local to the base ...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：Yale University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We exhibit a natural environment, social learning among heterogeneous agents, where even slight misperceptions can have a large negative impact on long-run learning outcomes. We consider a population of agents who obtain information about the state of the world both from initial private signals and by observing a random sample of other agents' actions over time, where agents' actions depend not only on their beliefs about the state but also on their idiosyncratic types (e.g., tastes or risk at...
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作者：Sheng, Shuyang
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：The objective of this paper is to identify and estimate network formation models using observed data on network structure. We characterize network formation as a simultaneous-move game, where the utility from forming a link depends on the structure of the network, thereby generating strategic interactions between links. With the prevalence of multiple equilibria, the parameters are not necessarily point identified. We leave the equilibrium selection unrestricted and propose a partial identific...
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作者：Abadie, Alberto; Athey, Susan; Imbens, Guido W.; Wooldridge, Jeffrey M.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Stanford University; Michigan State University
摘要：Consider a researcher estimating the parameters of a regression function based on data for all 50 states in the United States or on data for all visits to a website. What is the interpretation of the estimated parameters and the standard errors? In practice, researchers typically assume that the sample is randomly drawn from a large population of interest and report standard errors that are designed to capture sampling variation. This is common even in applications where it is difficult to art...
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作者：Georgiadis, George; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper considers a Principal-Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information-acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for t...
