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作者：Kessler, Judd B.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Providing information about contributions to public goods is known to generate further contributions. However, it is often impossible to provide verifiable information on contributions. Through a large-scale field experiment and a series of laboratory experiments, I show that nonbinding announcements of support for a public good encourage others to contribute, even when actual contributions might not or cannot be made. Providing a way to easily announce support for a charity increases donation...
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作者：Ottoni-Wilhelm, Mark; Vesterlund, Lise; Xie, Huan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：Researchers measure crowd-out around one level of charity output to identify whether giving is motivated by altruism and/or warm-glow. However, crowd-out depends on output, implying first that the power to reject pure altruism varies, and second that a single measurement of incomplete crowd-out can be rationalized by many different preferences. By instead measuring crowd-out at different output levels, we allow both for identification and for a novel and direct test of impure altruism. Using a...
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作者：Cascaldi-Garcia, Danilo
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：Kurmann and Otrok (2013) establish that the effects on economic activity from news on future productivity growth are similar to the effects from unexpected changes in the slope of the yield curve. This comment shows that these results become substantially weaker in the light of a recent update in the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity series produced by Fernald (2014).
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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Kyiv School of Economics; National Bank of Ukraine; University of St Andrews
摘要：Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates ...
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作者：Thomassen, Oyvind; Smith, Howard; Seiler, Stephan; Schiraldi, Pasquale
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Stanford University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In many competitive settings, consumers buy multiple product categories, and some prefer to use a single firm, generating complementary cross-category price effects. To study pricing in supermarkets, an organizational form where these effects are internalized, we develop a multi-category, multi-seller demand model and estimate it using UK consumer data. This class of model is used widely in theoretical analysis of retail pricing. We quantify cross-category pricing effects and find that interna...
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作者：Al-Ubaydli, Omar; List, John A.; Suskind, Dana L.
作者单位：George Mason University; George Mason University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
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作者：Decker, Ryan A.; Haltiwanger, John; Jarmin, Ron S.; Miranda, Javier
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
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作者：Donato, Katherine; Miller, Grant; Mohanan, Manoj; Truskinovsky, Yulya; Vera-Hernandez, Marcos
作者单位：Harvard University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University; Harvard University; University of London; University College London
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作者：Greenwood, Jeremy; Kircher, Philipp; Santos, Cezar; Tertilt, Michele
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; European University Institute; University of Edinburgh; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Mannheim
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作者：Feyrer, James; Mansur, Erin T.; Sacerdote, Bruce
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We track the geographic and temporal propagation of local economic shocks from new oil and gas production generated by hydrofracturing. Each million dollars of new production produces $80,000 in wage income and $132,000 in royalty and business income within a county. Within 100 miles, one million dollars of new production generates $257,000 in wages and $286,000 in royalty and business income. Roughly two-thirds of the wage income increase persists for two years. Assuming no general equilibriu...
