Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Kyiv School of Economics; National Bank of Ukraine; University of St Andrews
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140494
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2666-2694
• 关键词: reduced form auctions; mechanism design; implementation; CONTRACTS; procurement; RESOURCES; price

摘要

Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below.