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作者：Field, Erica; Pande, Rohini; Rigol, Natalia; Schaner, Simone; Moore, Charity Troyer
作者单位：Duke University; Yale University; Harvard University; University of Southern California
摘要：Can increasing control over earnings incentivize a woman to work, and thereby influence norms around gender roles? We randomly varied whether rural Indian women received bank accounts, training in account use, and direct deposit of public sector wages into their own (versus husbands') accounts. Relative to the accounts only group, women who also received direct deposit and training worked more in public and private sector jobs. The private sector result suggests gender norms initially constrai...
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作者：Snowberg, Erik; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：University of British Columbia; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University
摘要：We leverage a large-scale incentivized survey eliciting behaviors from (almost) an entire undergraduate university student population, a representative sample of the US population, and Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to address concerns about the external validity of experiments with student participants. Behavior in the student population offers bounds on behaviors in other populations, and correlations between behaviors are similar across samples. Furthermore, non-student samples exhibit high...
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作者：Schwartzstein, Joshua; Sunderam, Adi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We present a framework where model persuaders inf hence receivers' beliefs by proposing models that organize past data to make predictions. Receivers are assumed to find models more compelling when they better explain the data, fixing receivers' prior beliefs. Model persuaders face a trade-gTh better-fitting models induce less movement in receivers' beliefs. Consequently, a receiver exposed to the true model can be most misled by persuasion when that model fits poorly, competition between pers...
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作者：Clark, Daniel; Fudenberg, Drew
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual speeches that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, s...
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作者：Hahn, Robert W.; Metcalfe, Robert D.
作者单位：University of Oxford; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Economic theory suggests that energy subsidies can lead to excessive consumption and environmental degradation. However, the precise impact of energy subsidies is not well understood. We analyze a large energy subsidy: the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE). CARE provides a price reduction for low-income consumers of natural gas and electricity. Using a natural field experiment, we estimate the price elasticity of demand for natural gas to be about - 0.35 for CARE customers. An econo...
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作者：Ambuehl, Sandro; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Ockenfels, Axel
作者单位：University of Zurich; Stanford University; University of Cologne
摘要：We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. They violate common behavioral welfare criteria by removing impatient options even when all pay-offs are delayed. CAs intervene not by removing options they wish they could resist when choosing for t...
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作者：Ellison, Glenn; Pathak, Parag A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Several K-12 and university systems have adopted race-neutral affirmative action in place of race-based alternatives. This paper explores whether these plans are effective substitutes for racial quotas in Chicago Public Schools (CPS), which now employs a race-neutral, place-based affirmative action system at its selective exam high schools. The CPS plan is ineffective compared to plans that explicitly consider race: about three-quarters of the reduction in average entrance scores at the top sc...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Miralles, Antonio; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Messina; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents...
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作者：Miller, Nathan H.; Sheu, Gloria; Weinberg, Matthew C.
作者单位：Georgetown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model's structure. In an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to Bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. We simulat...
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作者：Domurat, Richard; Menashe, Isaac; Yin, Wesley
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We experimentally varied information mailed to 87,000 households in California's health insurance marketplace to study the role of frictions in insurance take-up. Reminders about the enrollment deadline raised enrollment by 1.3 pp (16 percent) in this typically low take-up population. Heterogeneous effects of personalized subsidy information indicate misperceptions about program benefits. Consistent with an adverse selection model with frictional enrollment costs, the intervention lowered aver...
