What Motivates Paternalism? An Experimental Study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambuehl, Sandro; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Ockenfels, Axel
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Stanford University; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191039
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 787-830
• 关键词: TIME-INCONSISTENT; egocentric bias; INFORMATION; preference; perception; ECONOMICS; kidneys; weight; height; MODEL

摘要

We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others' choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. They violate common behavioral welfare criteria by removing impatient options even when all pay-offs are delayed. CAs intervene not by removing options they wish they could resist when choosing for themselves (mistakes-projective paternalism), but rather as if they seek to align others' choices with their own aspirations (ideals-projective paternalism). Laboratory choices predict subjects' support for actual paternalistic policies.