Justified Communication Equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clark, Daniel; Fudenberg, Drew
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201692
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3004-3034
• 关键词: rationalizable conjectural equilibrium; Strategic stability; talk; games; nash; securities; BACKWARD; DYNAMICS

摘要

Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual speeches that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in -co-monotonic signaling games.