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作者：Clayton, Christopher; Schaab, Andreas
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Should central banks' inflation targets remain set in stone? We study a dynamic mechanism design problem between a government and a central bank. The central bank has persistent private information about structural shocks. Firms learn the state from the central bank's reports and form inflation expectations. A dynamic inflation target implements the full-information commitment allocation. The central bank is delegated the authority to adjust the target's level and flexibility one period in adv...
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作者：Jha, Akshaya; Leslie, Gordon
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Monash University
摘要：Firms expect to recover the fixed costs required to start production by earning positive operating profits in subsequent periods. We develop a dynamic competitive benchmark that accounts for start-up costs, showing that static markups overstate the rents attributable to market power in an electricity market where generators frequently stop and start production in response to rooftop solar output. We demonstrate that the large-scale expansion of solar capacity can lead to increases in the colle...
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作者：Benigno, Gianluca; Fornaro, Luca; Wolf, Martin
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); University of St Gallen
摘要：We provide a model connecting the global saving glut to productivity growth. The key feature is that the tradable sector is the engine of growth of the economy. Capital flows from developing countries to the United States boost demand for US nontradable goods, inducing a reallocation of US economic activity from the tradable sector to the nontradable one. In turn, lower profits in the tradable sector lead firms to cut back investment in innovation. Since innovation in the United States determi...
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作者：Basak, Deepal; Deb, Joyee; Kuvalekar, Aditya
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; New York University; University of Essex
摘要：We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face la...
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作者：Sigstad, Henrik
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Judge IV designs rely on monotonicity-each judge being weakly stricter than more lenient judges in all cases. I measure monotonicity in judicial panels in five different settings and find that it is violated in up to 50 percent of nonunanimous cases. The monotonicity violations are not detected by conventional tests, but they would typically induce little bias in judge IV estimates. (JEL C26, K41, K42, O17)
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作者：Athey, Susan
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper provides an economic perspective on data-driven innovation in digital products, focusing on the role of complex experiments in measuring and improving social impact. The discussion highlights how tools and insights from economics contribute to each stage of the innovation process. Key contributions include identifying problems, developing theoretical frameworks, translating goals into measurable outcomes, analyzing historical data, and estimating counterfactual outcomes. The paper a...
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作者：Rexer, Jonah M.
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states face resource theft by armed groups. Criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased local firms' participation substantially. Despite lower quality, local firms increase output by reducing oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. D...
