Similarity of Information and Collective Action

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Basak, Deepal; Deb, Joyee; Kuvalekar, Aditya
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; New York University; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20241056
• 发表日期: 2026-04
• 页码: 1189-1233
• 关键词: social value; games; PARTICIPATION; COORDINATION; TECHNOLOGY; models

摘要

We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. More similar information can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving the common goal when it is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why less powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests if they restrict press freedom, when committee diversity is beneficial in costly voting, and when a more diverse community contributes more to public good provision. (JEL C71, D71, D72, D81, D82, D83, H41)