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作者：Kaniel, Ron; Orlov, Dmitry
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Adverse selection benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. An agent's track record gradually reduces intermediary's information advantage. In response, the intermediary starts churning well-performing agents she knows are less skilled. The accelerated reduction in information advantage boosts profits, as retained agents accept below-reservation wages to build reputation...
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作者：Hausman, Catherine
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Accelerated investment in electricity transmission could reduce total costs and enhance renewable integration. I document static allocative inefficiencies induced by incomplete market integration in 2 major US markets; these have risen over time and totaled $2 billion in 2022. I also argue that estimating firm-level impacts is important, as incumbents may have the power to block new lines and other reforms. I show that 4 firms would have experienced a collective $1.3 billion drop in net revenu...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Natenzon, Paulo; Raymond, Collin
作者单位：Georgetown University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Washington University (WUSTL); Cornell University
摘要：We introduce a new model of stochastic choice that assigns each choice option a utility, along with a salience parameter reflecting economic frictions. We characterize our model behaviorally and investigate its comparative statics properties. We show that the model generates intuitive closed-form solutions in equilibrium settings where firms can choose price, quality, and advertising. In addition, we show that the model allows for flexible substitution patterns and changes in market shares acr...
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作者：Monte, Ferdinando; Porcher, Charly; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban
作者单位：Georgetown University; Georgetown University; University of Chicago
摘要：Relative to remote work, working downtown facilitates valuable interactions with other in-office workers but entails commuting costs. The resulting coordination mechanism can lead to multiple stationary equilibria with varying levels of remote work. Temporary reductions in commuters, as in the COVID-19 pandemic, can lead to persistently large fractions of remote workers. Cell phone-based mobility data for the United States shows commuting trips in the largest cities, which are more likely to e...
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作者：Ai, Hengjie; Bansal, Ravi; Guo, Hongye; Yaron, Amir
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Hong Kong; Bank of Israel
摘要：This paper develops an asset market-based test for preference for the timing of resolution of uncertainty. Our main theorem provides a characterization of preference for early resolution of uncertainty in terms of the risk premium realized during the period when the informativeness of macroeconomic announcements is resolved. Empirically, we find support for preference for early resolution of uncertainty based on evidence on the dynamics of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options before...
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作者：Choukhmane, Taha; Goodman, Lucas; O'Dea, Cormac
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); United States Department of the Treasury; Yale University
摘要：We study how couples allocate retirement-saving contributions across each spouse's account. In a new dataset covering over a million US individuals, we find retirement contributions are not allocated to the account with the highest employer match rate. This lack of coordination-which goes against the assumptions of most models of household decision-making-is common, costly, persistent over time, and cannot be explained by inertia, auto-enrollment, or simple heuristics. Complementing the admini...
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作者：Urvoy, Camille
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：What makes politicians respond to civil society organizations' demands? I use new data on government transfers to French associations and exploit close elections to show that politicians grant more funds to ideologically close organizations when the local incumbent is a political ally and was elected by a small margin. The results are consistent with politicians and organizations exchanging financial support for electoral support. Organizations secure funding because of the votes they can deli...
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作者：Morchio, Iacopo; Moser, Christian
作者单位：University of Bristol; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Using linked employer-employee data from Brazil, we document a significant gender pay gap, which is largely attributed to women working at lower-paying employers. To interpret this fact, we develop an equilibrium search model with endogenous firm pay, amenities, and hiring. We provide a constructive proof of identification of all model parameters. The estimated model suggests that amenities are important for both men and women, and that compensating differentials account for half of the gender...
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作者：Wittwer, Milena; Allen, Jason
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Bank of Canada; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We explore how traders' equity capitalization influences asset prices in a framework that accounts for market power. In our model, traders with capital constraints engage in transactions in an imperfectly competitive market. We demonstrate that looser capital constraints elevate both asset prices and price impact, the latter diminishing market liquidity. Using Canadian Treasury auction data, we illustrate how to apply our model to quantify these effects. We estimate the shadow costs of capital...
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作者：Munoz, Pablo; Otero, Cristobal
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Getulio Vargas Foundation; Columbia University
摘要：We study whether the quality of managers can affect public service provision in the context of public health. Using novel data from public hospitals in Chile, we show how the introduction of a competitive recruitment system and better pay for public hospital CEOs reduced hospital mortality by 8 percent. The effect is not explained by a change in patient composition. We find that the policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing doctors with no management training in favor of CEOs who had studi...
