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作者：Guntin, Rafael; Ottonello, Pablo; Perez, Diego J.
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; New York University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study crises characterized by large adjustments of aggregate consumption through their microlevel patterns. We document the cross-sectional patterns of consumption adjustment across the income distribution and find large adjustments for top-income households, who exhibit consumption-income elasticities similar to or larger than the average. We construct a heterogeneous-agent open economy model of consumption under income fluctuations and show that the data pat-terns are largely consistent w...
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作者：Gaynor, Martin; Mehta, Nirav; Richards-Shubik, Seth
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Western University (University of Western Ontario); Lehigh University
摘要：We study health-care provider agency and optimal payments, consid-ering an expensive medication for dialysis patients. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which providers differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel applica-tion of nonlinear pricing methods, we empirically characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. The optimal contracts eliminate medically excessiv...
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作者：Carlino, Gerald; Drautzburg, Thorsten; Inman, Robert; Zarra, Nicholas
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：Partisanship of state governors affects the efficacy of US federal fis-cal policy. Using close election data, we find partisan differences in the marginal propensity to spend federal intergovernmental trans-fers: Republican governors spend less than Democratic governors. Correspondingly, Republican-led states have lower debt, (delayed) lower taxes, and initially lower economic activity. A New Keynesian model of partisan states in a monetary union implies sizable aggre-gate effects: The intergo...
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作者：Braxton, Carter; Taska, Bledi
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine the role of technological change in explaining the large and persistent decline in earnings following job loss. Using detailed skill requirements from the near universe of online vacancies, we estimate technological change by occupation and find that techno-logical change accounts for 45 percent of the decline in earnings after job loss. Technological change lowers earnings after job loss by requiring workers to have new skills to perform newly created jobs in their prior occupation...
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作者：Matray, Adrien; Boissel, Charles
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作者：Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Orhun, Yesim; Raymond, Collin
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Cornell University
摘要：We examine whether people have an intrinsic preference for nega-tively skewed or positively skewed information structures and how these preferences relate to intrinsic preferences for informativeness. The results from lab experiments show a strong intrinsic preference for positively skewed information and suggest that providing such information can improve information uptake. Evidence from field studies in decision-and ego-relevant contexts replicates these find-ings. We discuss our findings t...
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作者：Bhaskar, Dhruva; Mcclellan, Andrew; Sadler, Evan
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：Regulators often impose rules that constrain the behavior of market participants. We study the design of regulatory policy in an insurance market as a delegation problem. A regulator restricts the menus of contracts an informed firm is permitted to offer, the firm offers a per-mitted menu to each consumer, and consumers choose contracts from offered menus. If consumer types and firm signals are ordered in a way that reflects coverage need, the regulator can leverage the firm's information by f...
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作者：Buchmann, Nina; Field, Erica; Glennerster, Rachel; Nazneen, Shahana; Wang, Xiao Yu
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We experimentally evaluate a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. While girls eligible for two years of incen-tive are 19 percent less likely to marry underage, the empowerment program failed to decrease adolescent marriage. We show that these results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but prefer...
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作者：Lashkaripour, Ahmad; Lugovskyy, Volodymyr
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper examines the efficacy of second-best trade restrictions at correcting sectoral misallocation due to scale economies or prof-it-generating markups. To this end, we characterize optimal trade and industrial policies in an important class of quantitative trade models with scale effects and profits, estimating the structural parameters that govern policy outcomes. Our estimates reveal that standalone trade policy measures are remarkably ineffective at correcting mis-allocation, even whe...
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作者：Ostrovsky, Michael
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Choice screen auctions have been recently deployed in 31 European countries, allowing consumers to choose their preferred search engine on Google's Android platform instead of being automatically defaulted to Google's own search engine. I show that a seemingly minor detail in the design of these auctions-whether they are conducted on a per appearance or a per install basis-plays a major role in the mix and characteristics of auction winners and, consequently, in their expected market share. Fu...
