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作者:Graves, Jennifer
作者单位:University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
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作者:Reinhart, Carmen M.; Rogoff, Kenneth S.
作者单位:Harvard University; Harvard University
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作者:Shoag, Daniel
作者单位:Harvard University
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作者:Di Tella, Rafael; Dubra, Juan
作者单位:Harvard University; Universidad de Montevideo
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作者:Frakes, Michael
作者单位:Cornell University
摘要:I explore the association between regional variations in physician behavior and the geographical scope of malpractice standards of care. I estimate a 30-50 percent reduction in the gap between state and national utilization rates of various treatments and diagnostic procedures following the adoption of a rule requiring physicians to follow national, as opposed to local, standards. These findings suggest that standardization in malpractice law may lead to greater standardization in practices an...
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作者:Barberis, Nicholas
作者单位:Yale University
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作者:Burda, Michael C.; Hamermesh, Daniel S.; Stewart, Jay
作者单位:Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; United States Department of Labor
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作者:Lee, Robin S.
作者单位:New York University
摘要:This paper measures the impact of vertically integrated and exclusive software on industry structure and welfare in the sixth-generation of the US video game industry (2000-2005). I specify and estimate a dynamic model of both consumer demand for hardware and software products, and software demand for hardware platforms. I use estimates to simulate market outcomes had platforms been unable to own or contract exclusively with software. Driven by increased software compatibility, hardware and so...
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作者:Lim, Claire S. H.
作者单位:Cornell University
摘要:We study how two selection systems for public officials, appointment and election, affect policy outcomes, focusing on state court judges and their criminal sentencing decisions. First, under appointment, policy congruence with voter preferences is attained through selecting judges with homogeneous preferences. In contrast, under election, judges face strong reelection incentives, while selection on preferences is weak. Second, the effectiveness of election in attaining policy congruence criti...
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作者:Glaeser, Edward L.
作者单位:Harvard University