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作者:Duflo, Esther; Greenstone, Michael; Pande, Rohini; Ryan, Nicholas
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
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作者:Mbiti, Isaac; Weil, David N.
作者单位:Southern Methodist University; Brown University
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作者:Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq; Rosenzweig, Mark R.
作者单位:Yale University
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作者:Dunbar, Geoffrey R.; Lewbel, Arthur; Pendakur, Krishna
作者单位:Simon Fraser University; Boston College
摘要:The share of household resources devoted to children is hard to identify because consumption is measured at the household level and goods can be shared. Using semiparametric restrictions on individual preferences within a collective model, we identify how total household resources are divided up among household members by observing how each family member's expenditures on a single private good like clothing vary with income and family size. Using data from Malawi we show how resources devoted ...
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作者:Anderson, Axel; Smith, Lones
作者单位:Georgetown University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要:We characterize the unique equilibrium of a competitive continuous time game between a resource-constrained informed player and a sequence of rivals who partially observe his action intensity. Our game adds noisy monitoring and impatient players to Aumann and Maschler (1966), and also subsumes insider trading models. The intensity bound induces a novel strategic bias and serial mean reversion by uninformed players. We compute the duration of the informed player's informational edge. The uninfo...
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作者:Blanchard, Olivier J.; L'Huillier, Jean-Paul; Lorenzoni, Guido
作者单位:International Monetary Fund; Northwestern University
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作者:Kovrijnykh, Natalia
作者单位:Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要:This paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments, and the lender offers long-term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated. No commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one, respectively. I show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare. Furthermore, properties of equilibrium investment dynamics ...
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作者:Parker, Jonathan A.; Souleles, Nicholas S.; Johnson, David S.; McClelland, Robert
作者单位:Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania; Congressional Budget Office
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作者:Busse, Meghan R.; Lacetera, Nicola; Pope, Devin G.; Silva-Risso, Jorge; Sydnor, Justin R.
作者单位:Northwestern University; University of Toronto; University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者:Fryer, Roland G., Jr.; Levitt, Steven D.
作者单位:Harvard University; University of Chicago