Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Robin S.
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.7.2960
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2960-3000
• 关键词: dynamic oligopoly; US; COMPETITION; welfare; compatibility; consumers; demand; models; CHOICE

摘要

This paper measures the impact of vertically integrated and exclusive software on industry structure and welfare in the sixth-generation of the US video game industry (2000-2005). I specify and estimate a dynamic model of both consumer demand for hardware and software products, and software demand for hardware platforms. I use estimates to simulate market outcomes had platforms been unable to own or contract exclusively with software. Driven by increased software compatibility, hardware and software sales would have increased by 7 percent and 58 percent and consumer welfare by $1.5 billion. Gains would be realized only by the incumbent, suggesting exclusivity favored the entrant platforms.