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作者：Krebs, Tom; Kuhn, Moritz; Wright, Mark L. J.
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Bonn; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We use microdata to show that young households with children are underinsured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies. This empirical finding can be explained by a macroeconomic model with human capital risk, age-dependent returns to human capital investment, and endogenous borrowing constraints due to limited contract enforcement. When calibrated, the model quantitatively accounts for the observed life-cycle variation in life insurance holdings, financial wealth, earnings,...
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作者：Edmond, Chris; Midrigan, Virgiliu; Xu, Daniel Yi
作者单位：University of Melbourne; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University
摘要：We study the procompetitive gains from international trade in a quantitative model with endogenously variable markups. We find that trade can significantly reduce markup distortions if two conditions are satisfied: (i) there is extensive misallocation, and (ii) opening to trade exposes hitherto dominant producers to greater competitive pressure. We measure the extent to which these two conditions are satisfied in Taiwanese producer-level data. Versions of our model consistent with the Taiwanes...
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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Fradkin, Andrey; Popov, Igor
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. Using realistically parameterized models, we show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. While...
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作者：Al-Ubaydli, Omar; List, John A.
作者单位：George Mason University; George Mason University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Kleinberg, Jon; Ludwig, Jens; Mullainathan, Sendhil; Obermeyer, Ziad
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard Medical School; Harvard University; Harvard University Medical Affiliates; Brigham & Women's Hospital
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作者：Lazear, Edward P.
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University
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作者：Ray, Debajyoti; Shum, Matthew; Camerer, Colin F.
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作者：Hackmann, Martin B.; Kolstad, Jonathan T.; Kowalski, Amanda E.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
摘要：We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the parameters of the model. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate. We find an annual welfare gain of 4.1 percent per person or $51.1 million annually in Massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection. We also find...
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作者：Tadelis, Steven; Zettelmeyer, Florian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University
摘要：Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across cars that are vertically ranked by quality. This implies that information disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality, causing bot...
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作者：Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：When will solidarity, which emerges spontaneously from the fear of spillovers, be reinforced through contracting? The optimal pact between countries that differ substantially in their probability of distress is a simple debt contract with market financing, a borrowing cap, but no joint liability. While joint liability augments total surplus, the borrowing country cannot compensate the deep-pocket guarantor. By contrast, the optimal pact between two countries symmetrically exposed to shocks wit...
