Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tadelis, Steven; Zettelmeyer, Florian
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20110753
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 886-905
• 关键词: Adverse selection; product quality; auctions; MARKET

摘要

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across cars that are vertically ranked by quality. This implies that information disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality, causing both good and bad news to increase competition and revenues. The data confirm these hypotheses. These findings have implications for the design of other markets, including e-commerce, procurement auctions, and labor markets.