Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krebs, Tom; Kuhn, Moritz; Wright, Mark L. J.
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Bonn; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20111681
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 3223-3272
• 关键词: life-insurance; consumption inequality; credit; DYNAMICS; constraints; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; bankruptcy; MARKETS; US

摘要

We use microdata to show that young households with children are underinsured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies. This empirical finding can be explained by a macroeconomic model with human capital risk, age-dependent returns to human capital investment, and endogenous borrowing constraints due to limited contract enforcement. When calibrated, the model quantitatively accounts for the observed life-cycle variation in life insurance holdings, financial wealth, earnings, and consumption inequality. The model also predicts that reforms making consumer bankruptcy more costly will substantially increase the volume of both credit and insurance.