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作者：Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Nevo, Aviv; Town, Robert
作者单位：University of Arizona; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We estimate a bargaining model of competition between hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs) and use the estimates to evaluate the effects of hospital mergers. We find that MCO bargaining restrains hospital prices significantly. The model demonstrates the potential impact of coinsurance rates, which allow MCOs to partly steer patients toward cheaper hospitals. We show that increasing patient coinsurance tenfold would reduce prices by 16 percent. We find that a proposed hospital acquis...
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作者：Rothstein, Jesse
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Teacher contracts that condition pay and retention on demonstrated performance can improve selection into and out of teaching. I study alternative contracts in a simulated teacher labor market that incorporates dynamic self-selection and Bayesian learning. Bonus policies create only modest incentives and thus have small effects on selection. Reductions in tenure rates can have larger effects, but must be accompanied by substantial salary increases; elimination of tenure confers little addition...
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作者：Pomeranz, Dina
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there is surprisingly little evidence. This paper analyzes the role of third-party information for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000 Chilean firms. Announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail, indicating the paper trail's preventive deterrence effe...
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作者：Bai, Yan; Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
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作者：Beshears, John; Choi, James J.; Hurwitz, Joshua; Laibson, David; Madrian, Brigitte C.
作者单位：Harvard University; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Harvard University
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作者：Thaler, Richard
作者单位：University of Chicago
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作者：Ebert, Sebastian; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Tilburg University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We provide a result on prospect theory decision makers who are naive about the time inconsistency induced by probability weighting. If a market offers a sufficiently rich set of investment strategies, investors postpone their trading decisions indefinitely due to a strong preference for skewness. We conclude that probability weighting in combination with naivete leads to unrealistic predictions for a wide range of dynamic setups.
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do: she knows some actions available to the agent, but other, unknown actions may also exist. The principal demands robustness, evaluating possible contracts by their worst-case performance, over unknown actions the agent might potentially take. The model assumes risk-neutrality and limited liability, and no other functional form assumptions. Very generally, the optimal contract is linear. T...
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作者：Kosfeld, Michael; Rustagi, Devesh
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We conduct a social dilemma experiment in which real-world leaders can punish group members as a third party. Despite facing an identical environment, leaders are found to take remarkably different punishment approaches. The different leader types revealed experimentally explain the relative success of groups in managing their forest commons. Leaders who emphasize equality and efficiency see positive forest outcomes. Antisocial leaders, who punish indiscriminately, see relatively negative fore...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to certain subsets on the other side. Real-life examples include restrictions on regions in medical matching, academic master's programs in graduate admission, and state-financed seats for college admission. Motivated by these markets, we study design of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We sho...
