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作者:Brunnermeier, Markus K.; Sockin, Michael; Xiong, Wei
作者单位:Princeton University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
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作者:Guvenen, Fatih; Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam; Song, Jae; Yogo, Motohiro
作者单位:University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Princeton University
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作者:Huang, Jennie; Low, Corinne
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania
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作者:Luo, Ye; Wang, Hai
作者单位:State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Singapore Management University
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作者:Niederle, Muriel
作者单位:Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Zwick, Eric; Mahon, James
作者单位:University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
摘要:We estimate the effect of temporary tax incentives on equipment investment using shifts in accelerated depreciation. Analyzing data for over 120,000 firms, we present three findings. First, bonus depreciation raised investment in eligible capital relative to ineligible capital by 10.4 percent between 2001 and 2004 and 16.9 percent between 2008 and 2010. Second, small firms respond 95 percent more than big firms. Third, firms respond strongly when the policy generates immediate cash flows, but ...
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作者:Li, Shengwu
摘要:A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This has a behavioral interpretation: a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical ...
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作者:Ollar, Mariann; Penta, Antonio
作者单位:University of Groningen; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要:Multiplicity of equilibria and the dependence on strong common knowledge assumptions are well-known problems in mechanism design. We address them by studying full implementation via transfer schemes, under general restrictions on agents' beliefs. We show that incentive-compatible transfers ensure uniqueness-and hence full implementation-if they induce sufficiently weak strategic externalities. We then design transfers for full implementation by using information on beliefs in order to weaken t...
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作者:Alvaredo, Facundo; Chancel, Lucas; Piketty, Thomas; Saez, Emmanuel; Zucman, Gabriel
作者单位:Paris School of Economics; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者:Apicella, Coren L.; Demiral, Elif E.; Mollerstrom, Johanna
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; George Mason University; Humboldt University of Berlin; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)