Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ollar, Mariann; Penta, Antonio
• 署名单位: University of Groningen; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151462
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2243-2277
• 关键词: dominant-strategy implementation; Robust virtual implementation; Informational size; ascending auctions; mechanism design; equilibrium; predictions; uncertainty; allocation; VALUES

摘要

Multiplicity of equilibria and the dependence on strong common knowledge assumptions are well-known problems in mechanism design. We address them by studying full implementation via transfer schemes, under general restrictions on agents' beliefs. We show that incentive-compatible transfers ensure uniqueness-and hence full implementation-if they induce sufficiently weak strategic externalities. We then design transfers for full implementation by using information on beliefs in order to weaken the strategic externalities of the baseline canonical transfers. Our results rely on minimal restrictions on agents' beliefs, specifically on moments of the distribution of types, that arise naturally in applications. (JEL D62, D82, D83)