Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Shengwu
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20160425
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 3257-3287
• 关键词: Incentive compatibility; indivisible goods; vickrey auctions; players models; FORM GAMES; equilibrium; DESIGN; economies; 2nd-price; BEHAVIOR

摘要

A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This has a behavioral interpretation: a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical interpretation: a choice rule is OSP-implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment.