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作者：Shi, Fanqi; Zhang, Yutong; Chen, Litian
作者单位：Peking University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the information design and pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist who faces a buyer with unit demand. Under omniscient disclosure, we show that one profit-maximizing menu reveals the identity of the highest quality product and allocates that product, provided a type-specific quality threshold is met. This menu remains optimal under private disclosure if the buyer's value has constant differences in quality and type, or if the value has non-decreasing differences in quality and...
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作者：Myatt, David P.; Ronayne, David
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We study the pricing of homogeneous products sold to customers who consider different sets of suppliers. We identify prices that are stable in the sense that no firm wishes to undercut a rival or to raise its price when rivals are able to respond by offering special deals. We derive stable and dispersed prices across several price-consideration specifications. We contrast the implications against those of conventional approaches.
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作者：Guan, Junyan; Xu, Boli
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Iowa
摘要：This article considers an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show that the signaling incentive would lower the seller's payoff and the probability of sale. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. Counterfactual simulations suggest that a secret reserve price could shut down the signaling incentive and improve both the seller's payoff and the probability of sale, ...
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作者：Fabra, Natalia; Llobet, Gerard
摘要：This article investigates the influence of technological ownership on pricing strategies and productive efficiency. Our motivation comes from the evolving landscape of electricity markets where firms are transitioning from diversified to specialized portfolios, focusing on renewable energy or fossil fuels. Our theoretical model demonstrates that diversified firms compete more vigorously than their specialized counterparts. Conversely, specialized firms exhibit higher productive efficiency but ...
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作者：Yuan, Zhe; Barwick, Panle Jia
作者单位：Zhejiang University; University of Wisconsin System; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Wisconsin Madison; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This article proposes an empirical framework and a novel equilibrium concept to analyze network competition in the airline industry. A two-stage entry model links direct and indirect flights, using a technological relationship estimated from data to mimic the hub-and-spoke network. It employs revealed-preference arguments to bound fixed cost parameters, estimated using state-of-the-art econometric methods. Ignoring network externality undervalues the benefits of additional flights by 13.2% and...
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作者：Lyu, Qianjun
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This article studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer learns about their valuation over time. We consider various refund mechanisms including simple return policies (no returns or free returns), and stochastic return policies, which allow the buyer to keep the product with some probability upon receiving a refund. We show that the optimal refund mechanism is deterministic and takes a simple form: either the seller deters buyer learning by offering a low price without retur...
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作者：Cao, Yiran; Chen, Yongmin; Ding, Yucheng; Zhang, Tianle
作者单位：Jinan University; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Wuhan University; Lingnan University
摘要：We analyze a model where consumers sequentially search experts for treatment recommendations and prices, facing either zero or a positive search cost, whereas experts simultaneously compete in these two dimensions. In equilibrium, experts may cheat by overstating the severity of a consumer's problem and recommending an unnecessary treatment, prices follow distributions depending on the problem type and the treatment, and consumers employ Bayesian belief updating about their problem types durin...
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作者：Mukherjee, Arijit; Qi, Zijian; Vasconcelos, Luis
作者单位：Michigan State University; Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University; University of Technology Sydney; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：When managers rely on their subordinates for local information but cannot commit to how such information is used, the incentives for effort and information elicitation become intertwined. This incentive problem influences the firm's job design decision, that is, whether to assign all tasks in a job to one worker (individual assignment) or split those among a group (team assignment). Team assignment facilitates information elicitation but suffers from diseconomies of scope in incentive provisio...
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作者：Peitz, Martin; Sato, Susumu
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within-group and cross-group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group. We explore the effects of platform entry, a change of incumbent platforms' quality under free entry, and the degree of compatibility. We show how the analysis can be ...
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作者：Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：Product personalization opens the door to price discrimination. A rich product line allows firms to better tailor products to consumers' tastes, but the mere choice of a product carries valuable information about consumers that can be leveraged for price discrimination. We study this trade-off in an upstream - downstream model, where a consumer buys a good of variable quality upstream, followed by an indivisible good downstream. The downstream firm's use of the consumer's purchase history for ...
