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作者：Peitz, Martin; Sobolev, Anton
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations. We provide conditions under which a firm makes welfare-reducing purchase recommendations with positive probability, resulting in inflated recommendations. We extend this insight to a setting in which an intermediary makes the recommendations, wherea...
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作者：Vohra, Akhil
作者单位：University of Exeter; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Influencers, from propagandists to sellers, expend vast resources targeting agents who amplify their message through word-of-mouth communication. While agents differ in network position, they also differ in their bias: Agents may naturally read articles with a particular slant or buy products from a certain seller. Absent competition, an influencer prefers targeting central agents and those biased against it. If agents are unbiased, competition leads to influencers targeting more central agent...
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作者：Xu, Wenji; Yang, Shuoguang
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：A long-lived seller sells a new product of unknown value by offering prices and recommendations to short-lived consumers in continuous time. The seller receives consumer feedback about the product at a rate that increases with the instantaneous sales volume. The optimal selling mechanism features episodes of price discounts, during which the seller discontinuously lowers the price and offers unwarranted recommendations to consumers. The optimal pricing strategy depends on the nature of consume...
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作者：Denicolo, Vincenzo; Polo, Michele
作者单位：University of Bologna; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We analyze a dynamic model of repeated innovation where inventors may either be acquired by an incumbent or else resist takeover and challenge for leadership. In the short run, acquisitions always spur innovation because of the invention-for-buyout effect. In the longer run, however, they may stifle it because of a countervailing effect, the entrenchment of monopoly. The latter occurs when the incumbent's dominance depends on past levels of activity and is therefore reinforced by recurrent acq...
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作者：Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：A platform matches a unit mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to a unit mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit-quality. After matching, sellers make take-it-or-leave-it price-offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and the platform, but sellers make inferences from the matching algorithm. The efficient matching is positive assortative, but buyer-optimal matchings are stochastically negative assortative when there a...
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作者：Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jerome
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite; ESSEC Business School
摘要：Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on t...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano; Stepanov, Sergey
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：A privately informed sender can commit to any disclosure policy toward a receiver, whose actions affect the utility of the sender. We show that full disclosure is optimal under a sufficient condition with some desirable properties. First, it speaks directly to the parties' utility functions, as opposed to the sender's indirect utility function; this makes it easily interpretable and verifiable. Second, it does not require the sender's payoff to be a function of the posterior mean state. Third,...
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作者：Xiang, Jia
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：I estimate a Bayesian persuasion model to examine how financial incentives and asymmetric information shape physician-patient interactions. This approach offers new insights into the role of insurance. First, the model predicts that patients' coinsurance moderates physicians' responsiveness to increases in service fees. This prediction is supported by a difference-in-differences analysis using Chinese health insurance claims data with random variation in physicians' reimbursement and patients'...
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作者：Balakin, Sergei; Roger, Guillaume
摘要：We study a long-horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity-that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities by tacitly colluding. This cooperation takes new forms thanks to the multiplicity of actions they must take: selling, buying, or both. We construct payof...
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作者：Ahmad, Amal; Naeher, Dominik; Vollmer, Sebastian
作者单位：Wageningen University & Research; University of Gottingen
摘要：Incentivizing innovation through buyouts may alleviate the social costs associated with patent power, but the political economy and feasibility of this potentially important financing mechanism have been understudied. We study an international setting of countries with different innovation and financing capabilities, and where financing governments rely on taxes to fund buyouts and care about the electoral popularity of their decisions. Subsequent distributional conflict arises between countri...
