Strategic Trading and Blockholder Dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marinovic, Ivan; Varas, Felipe
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70040
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; OWNERSHIP; liquidity; MARKET; investor; reputation; COSTS; delay; IPO

摘要

We study strategic trading by a privately informed blockholder who monitors a company and trades its shares. Private information results in larger block sizes in good states, but by increasing the speed of the blockholder's selling, it can result in lower block sizes in bad states. Despite the heterogeneous impact on expected block size, we show that asymmetric information leads to Pareto improvements: it raises stock prices, benefits small uninformed shareholders, and benefits the block owner, despite the negative impact on liquidity.