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作者：Phang, Soon-Yeow; Dharmasiri, Prabashi; Puspitasari, Dani
作者单位：Monash University; Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT)
摘要：When evaluating the potential financial effects of climate change, investors demand disclosures of the climate-related risks and opportunities that companies need to manage. We examine how and why management control over climate change performance affects investors' evaluations of such disclosures. In a series of experiments, we find that investors believe that managerial optimism is beneficial and, thus, are more willing to invest when climate-related disclosures focus on opportunities rather...
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作者：D'Lima, Rohan; Rava, Ariel; Subasi, Musa
作者单位：NEOMA Business School; Yeshiva University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We examine whether foreign national directors (FNDs) on US corporate boards help their firms mitigate the adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) shocks originating from the directors' home countries. Using a comprehensive data set of US manufacturing firms' international supply chain relationships from 2003 to 2019, we find that EPU spikes in supplier countries lead to significant declines in aggregate US imports as well as in buyer firms' inventory purchases, sales, and market v...
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作者：Samet, Jordan; Schuhmacher, Karl; Towry, Kristy L.; Zureich, Jacob
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Emory University; Lehigh University
摘要：Reciprocity plays a critical role in the way employees respond to managerial control decisions. The current consensus is that employees punish managers for implementing unkind controls (negative reciprocity) more than they reward managers for implementing kind controls (positive reciprocity). We challenge this consensus. Prior research focuses on settings that emphasize employees' immediate reciprocal responses. However, in the workplace, employees often respond over long periods of time to st...
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作者：Charnock, Robert J.
摘要：As early as 2015, financial regulators were developing disclosure frameworks aimed at enabling capital markets to price climate risks. Yet the literature on sustainability disclosure offers little insight into how regulatory agendas change, instead focusing on how nongovernmental organizations drive voluntary disclosure. To address this deficiency, this paper charts how financial regulators came to embrace climate risk, analyzing how an array of non-state initiatives became coordinated in high...
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作者：Jia, Ning; Qian, Jiaqi; Tian, Xuan; Yu, Jinxin
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University; Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We examine the effect of product market competitors' listing delays on incumbent firms' defensive strategies, including efforts in customer retention and acquisition as well as merger and acquisition (M&A) activities. To establish causality, we use four regulation-induced IPO suspensions in China that expose firms already approved for an IPO to indeterminate listing delays. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that incumbent firms reduce efforts in customer retention and acquisiti...
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作者：De Franco, Gus; Small, R. Christopher; Wahid, Aida Sijamic
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Toronto
摘要：The US Department of Justice's increasing use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (D/NPAs) over the past two decades has sparked debate about their merits compared with traditional plea deals, which often result in criminal convictions. This study examines the factors influencing prosecutors' decisions to use D/NPAs in disciplining firms for corporate misconduct. We analyze whether the likelihood of a firm's future misconduct varies by the type of discipline imposed, compari...
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作者：Cannon, Nathan; Lamoreaux, Phillip; Maksymov, Eldar; Myers, Noah
作者单位：Texas State University System; Texas State University San Marcos; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah Valley University
摘要：The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandates the PCAOB to enforce compliance with its audit standards fairly. However, the enforcement process is not sufficiently transparent for public evaluation of its fairness, prompting a call by a former Board member for transparency of the process and for improvement suggestions from the public. Further, academic evidence on the PCAOB enforcement is limited. We address this call and the gap in the literature by interviewing 33 difficult-to-access participants...
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作者：Herkenhoff, Manuel; Nienhaus, Martin
作者单位：University of Munster; Ruhr University Bochum
摘要：This study finds that accounting standards play an important role in cross-border investor reactions to peer firm earnings. Specifically, we document that when international peer firms report under the same accounting standards, investors overreact to peer firms' earnings announcements. Using a sample of 35,116 firm-pair-years from 51 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that heightened information transfers for international same-standard firms are followed by predictable price reversals ...
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作者：Khurana, Inder K.; Raman, K. K.; Yun, Byongwook (Brian)
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio
摘要：We examine the implications of the PCAOB international inspection program for US companies' exports. Our difference-in-differences analyses suggest that, following the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad, (1) US companies' exports to that country increased, and (2) US companies' major customers in that country reported higher accounts payable. Probing further, the effect on US exports is stronger for companies requiring more relationship-specific investments and ...
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作者：Akins, Brian; Bitting, Jonathan; De Angelis, David; Gaulin, Maclean
作者单位：Rice University; University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：This paper shows that creditors' horizon interests impact the design of CEO compensation contracts. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that borrowing firms provide shorter incentives to their CEO following a loan covenant violation. They do so by decreasing the horizon of pay and tilting the choice of performance metrics toward accounting goals, in particular short-term ones. This effect is stronger when creditors' interests are more immediate, such as among loans with short rema...
