Reciprocity over time: Do employees respond more to kind or unkind controls?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Samet, Jordan; Schuhmacher, Karl; Towry, Kristy L.; Zureich, Jacob
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Emory University; Lehigh University
• 刊物名称: CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0823-9150
• DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.13023
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1490-1520
• 关键词: gift exchange; neural basis; field; fairness; NORM; inequity; honesty; wages; pay; ENFORCEMENT

摘要

Reciprocity plays a critical role in the way employees respond to managerial control decisions. The current consensus is that employees punish managers for implementing unkind controls (negative reciprocity) more than they reward managers for implementing kind controls (positive reciprocity). We challenge this consensus. Prior research focuses on settings that emphasize employees' immediate reciprocal responses. However, in the workplace, employees often respond over long periods of time to sticky control decisions (e.g., budgets, pay, decision rights). Focusing on these long-term settings, we predict and find that, while negative reciprocity is initially stronger than positive reciprocity, it also fades more over time than positive reciprocity. This differential fading is so pronounced in our setting that positive reciprocity is stronger overall in the long run. Thus, in long-term settings, positive responses to kind controls may play a more important role than negative responses to unkind controls. Our results inform managerial decisions about the use of kind versus unkind controls and suggest potential long-term benefits of pay disparity and other policies that treat employees differentially. La r & eacute;ciprocit & eacute; au fil du temps : les employ & eacute;s r & eacute;agissent-ils davantage aux contr & ocirc;les bienveillants ou malveillants?La r & eacute;ciprocit & eacute; joue un r & ocirc;le crucial dans la mani & egrave;re dont les employ & eacute;s r & eacute;agissent aux d & eacute;cisions de gestion relatives au contr & ocirc;le. Selon le consensus & eacute;tabli, les employ & eacute;s sanctionnent davantage les gestionnaires mettant en place des contr & ocirc;les malveillants (r & eacute;ciprocit & eacute; n & eacute;gative) qu'ils ne r & eacute;compensent ceux mettant en place des contr & ocirc;les bienveillants (r & eacute;ciprocit & eacute; positive). Les auteurs remettent en question ce consensus. Les & eacute;tudes pr & eacute;c & eacute;dentes se sont concentr & eacute;es sur des contextes conduisant & agrave; des r & eacute;actions r & eacute;ciproques et imm & eacute;diates des employ & eacute;s. Sur le lieu de travail toutefois, les employ & eacute;s r & eacute;agissent souvent sur des p & eacute;riodes prolong & eacute;es aux d & eacute;cisions d & eacute;licates relatives au contr & ocirc;le (par exemple, budgets, salaires, pouvoir d & eacute;cisionnel). Les auteurs pr & eacute;disent et constatent que, en examinant ces contextes temporels & eacute;largis, la r & eacute;ciprocit & eacute; n & eacute;gative, bien qu'& eacute;tant initialement plus intense que la r & eacute;ciprocit & eacute; positive, diminue davantage au fil du temps. Dans ce contexte, cette diminution d'& eacute;cart est si marqu & eacute;e que la r & eacute;ciprocit & eacute; positive s'av & egrave;re plus intense & agrave; long terme. Ainsi, dans des contextes temporels & eacute;largis, les r & eacute;actions positives aux contr & ocirc;les bienveillants peuvent jouer un r & ocirc;le plus important que les r & eacute;actions n & eacute;gatives aux contr & ocirc;les malveillants. Ces r & eacute;sultats sont utiles pour guider les d & eacute;cisions de gestion concernant l'exercice de contr & ocirc;les bienveillants ou malveillants et mettent en lumi & egrave;re les avantages potentiels & agrave; long terme li & eacute;s aux & eacute;carts de salaire et & agrave; d'autres politiques ax & eacute;es sur le traitement diff & eacute;rentiel des employ & eacute;s.