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作者：Ryall, Michael D.; Sorenson, Olav
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of London; London Business School; University of Toronto
摘要：The broker profits by intermediating between two (or more) parties. Using a biform game, we examine whether such a position can confer a competitive advantage, as well as whether any such advantage could persist if actors formed relations strategically. Our analysis reveals that, if one considers exogenous the relations between actors, brokers can enjoy an advantage but only if (1) they do not face substitutes either for the connections they offer or the value they can create, (2) they interme...
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作者：Guerbuez, Mustafa Cagri; Moinzadeh, Kamran; Zhou, Yong-Pin
作者单位：IE University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In this paper, we study the impact of coordinated replenishment and shipment in inventory/distribution systems. We analyze a system with multiple retailers and one outside supplier. Random demand occurs at each retailer, and the supplier replenishes all the retailers. In traditional inventory models, each retailer orders directly from the supplier whenever the need arises. We present a new, centralized ordering policy that orders for all retailers simultaneously. The new policy is equivalent t...
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作者：Budescu, David V.; Du, Ning
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; DePaul University
摘要：This study investigates the quality of direct probability judgments and quantile estimates with a focus on calibration and consistency. The two response modes use different measures of miscalibration, so it is difficult to directly compare their relative (in)accuracy. We employed a more refined within-subject design in which decision makers (DMs) used both response modes to make judgments about a random sample of stocks accompanied by identical information to facilitate comparison between the ...
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作者：Huang, Zan; Zeng, Daniel D.; Chen, Hsinchun
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Arizona
摘要：We apply random graph modeling methodology to analyze bipartite consumer-product graphs that represent sales transactions to better understand consumer purchase behavior in e-commerce settings. Based on two real-world e-commerce data sets, we found that such graphs demonstrate topological features that deviate significantly from theoretical predictions based on standard random graph models. In particular, we observed consistently larger-than-expected average path lengths and a greater-than-exp...
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作者：Eliashberg, Jehoshua; Hui, Sam K.; Zhang, Z. John
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Movie studios often have to choose among thousands of scripts to decide which ones to turn into movies. Despite the huge amount of money at stake, this process-known as green-lighting in the movie industry is largely a guesswork based on experts' experience and intuitions. In this paper, we propose a new approach to help studios evaluate scripts that will then lead to more profitable green-lighting decisions. Our approach combines screenwriting domain knowledge, natural-language processing tec...
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作者：Tucker, Anita L.; Nembhard, Ingrid M.; Edmondson, Amy C.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper contributes to research on organizational learning by investigating specific learning activities undertaken by improvement project teams in hospital intensive care units and proposing an integrative model to explain implementation success. Organizational learning is important in this context because medical knowledge changes constantly and hospital care units must learn new practices if they are to provide high-quality care. To develop a model of factors affecting improvement projec...
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作者：Yoo, Byungjoon; Choudhary, Vidyanand; Mukhopadhyay, Tridas
作者单位：Korea University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper analyzes electronic marketplaces with different ownership structures: biased marketplaces and neutral marketplaces. Biased marketplaces can be either buyer-owned or supplier-owned, whereas neutral marketplaces are owned by independent third parties. We develop a single-period model, with fulfilled expectations equilibrium. The buyers experience positive network effects that are a function of the number of suppliers and the suppliers receive similar positive network effects depending...
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作者：Zhu, Kaijie; Zhang, Rachel Q.; Tsung, Fugee
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：In this paper, we consider a buyer who designs a product and owns the brand, yet outsources the production to a supplier. Both the buyer and the supplier incur quality-related costs, e.g., costs of customer goodwill and future market share loss by the buyer and warranty-related costs shared by both the buyer and the supplier whenever a nonconforming item is sold to a customer. Therefore, both parties have an incentive to invest in quality-improvement efforts. This paper explores the roles of d...
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作者：Anderson, Edward; Kelly, Frank; Steinberg, Richard; Waters, Robert
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：In a recent paper, the first three authors proposed a method for determining how much to charge users of a communication network when they share bandwidth, and studied the existence and form of Nash equilibria for players' choices of capacity. However, the proof of one of the propositions in that paper contained a flaw. In this note, we prove that the original proposition is true under an additional condition, and provide two examples to show that this condition is necessary.
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作者：de Figueiredo, John M.; Silverman, Brian S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper integrates and extends the literatures on industry evolution and dominant firms to develop a dynamic theory of dominant and fringe competitive interaction in a segmented industry. It argues that a dominant firm, seeing contraction of growth in its current segment(s), enters new segments in which it can exploit its technological strengths, but that are sufficiently distant to avoid cannibalization. The dominant firm acts as a low-cost Stackelberg leader, driving down prices and trigg...
