A contract and balancing mechanism for sharing capacity in a communication network (vol 53, pg 1029, 2007)

• 成果类型: Correction
• 署名作者: Anderson, Edward; Kelly, Frank; Steinberg, Richard; Waters, Robert
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0663
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1029-1031
• 关键词: capacity contracts; congestion pricing; Nash equilibrium

摘要

In a recent paper, the first three authors proposed a method for determining how much to charge users of a communication network when they share bandwidth, and studied the existence and form of Nash equilibria for players' choices of capacity. However, the proof of one of the propositions in that paper contained a flaw. In this note, we prove that the original proposition is true under an additional condition, and provide two examples to show that this condition is necessary.