Electronic B2B marketplaces with different ownership structures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yoo, Byungjoon; Choudhary, Vidyanand; Mukhopadhyay, Tridas
• 署名单位: Korea University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0685
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 952-961
• 关键词: business-to-business; OWNERSHIP; network effect; Intermediary; marketplace

摘要

This paper analyzes electronic marketplaces with different ownership structures: biased marketplaces and neutral marketplaces. Biased marketplaces can be either buyer-owned or supplier-owned, whereas neutral marketplaces are owned by independent third parties. We develop a single-period model, with fulfilled expectations equilibrium. The buyers experience positive network effects that are a function of the number of suppliers and the suppliers receive similar positive network effects depending on the number of buyers. We develop a general model with atomistic buyers and suppliers. We find that biased marketplaces set prices to induce greater participation (demand) from both buyers and suppliers compared to a neutral marketplace. This counterintuitive result can be understood in the context of the positive cross-network effects experienced by buyers and suppliers and the added benefit to the owner of a biased marketplace from participating in the marketplace. Biased marketplaces also provide greater social welfare compared to neutral marketplaces.